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Approved For Release 2006/03/28 : CIA-RDP82M00591R000400010045-9

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

Major General Edward B. Giller, USAF (ret.)
Assistant General Manager for National Security
Atomic Energy Commission
Washington, D. C. 20545

Dear Ed:

Thank you for your letter of 24 October providing me with your comments and concerns on DCID 1/7. Other USIB members have also identified some problem areas. I am, therefore, referring your proposal and those of the other Board members on DCID 1/7 to the Security Committee for review and resubmission to the Board following consideration of all of the issues which have been raised.

Sincerely,


W. E. Colby

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UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20545

74-66642

October 24, 1974

Mr. William E. Colby
Director, Central Intelligence
Washington, D. C.

Dear Bill:

I am writing to express my concern with the proposed DCID 1/7 revising the CONTROLLED DISSEM intelligence caveat to "NOT RELEASABLE TO CONSULTANTS OR CONTRACTORS". My concern is that such a caveat will perhaps be interpreted in a very narrow sense and thus be counterproductive to the use of the national nuclear laboratories in their intelligence support role to the AEC and other USIB agencies.

I don't think it is necessary to make the case for our laboratories' capabilities to contribute to USIB-directed research and development, the technical requirements on key intelligence questions, and technical support to US negotiating teams such as SALT II and special Executive Branch committees.

I am sure you realize that the laboratories must have timely access to current data produced by the collection programs of USIB if they are to continue in this important technical support role, and I would appreciate your assistance in this regard.

As early as December 1972 the Department of Justice ruled that the special and unique relationship of our full-time weapons laboratory personnel enabled AEC to treat them as if they were full-time Federal employees for the purposes of the Federal Advisory Committee Act of 1972. I would therefore urge that you inform USIB agencies that the provision of DCID 1/7 as pertains to CONSULTANTS AND CONTRACTORS does not apply to the AEC national nuclear laboratories when their "need to know" has been established.

Sincerely,

Edward B. Giller
Edward B. Giller
Assistant General Manager
for National Security

Security Committee

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM			
UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP			
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	EA/DCI		
2	Chairman, USIB		
3	Ex. Sec., USIB		

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Remarks: On 10 October, General Walters, as Acting Director of Central Intelligence, authorized circulation of DCID 1/7, "Control of Dissemination of Intelligence," to the USIB for consideration. All USIB agency members have submitted their concurrence or comments. The NSA, Treasury and FBI members have concurred.

The Acting CIA member has withheld his concurrence pending a review by the Security Committee of whether NOFORN markings should be placed on appropriate USIB and IRAC documents, review of paragraph 6.a., and change of WINTEL to WNINTEL [paragraph 4.a.(1)].

The Acting State member concurred, but stated that certain aspects of the proposed directive present problems for State and, therefore, requested a review of the directive in an appropriate forum.

The Acting DIA member, while not identifying any specific problem, recommended that the subject DCID be remanded to the Security Committee for staffing and recommendation to the USIB.

The AEC representative to USIB expressed his concern with the DCID 1/7 revising the CONTROLLED DISSEM intelligence caveat to "NOT RELEASABLE TO CONSULTANTS OR CONTRACTORS." His concern is that such a caveat will perhaps be interpreted in a very narrow sense and thus be counterproductive to the use of the national nuclear laboratories in their intelligence support role to the AEC and other USIB agencies. General Giller's letter and a draft response is attached.

Because of the above concerns expressed by the USIB members, it is recommended that DCID 1/7 be referred to the Security Committee for review and resubmission to the Board following consideration of these issues. If you approve this recommendation, please sign the attached response to General Giller's letter.

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FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.			DATE
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